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The main interpretations of the quantum-mechanical wave function are pre-
sented emphasizing how they can be divided into two ensembles: The ones that
deny and the other ones that attribute a form of reality to quantum waves.
It is also shown why these waves cannot be classical and must be submitted to
the restriction of the complementarity principle. Applying the concept of smooth
complementarity, it is shown that there can be no reason to attribute reality
only to the events and not to the wave or to the initial state of a given sys-
tem. Thereafter, an experiment proposed by the authors is presented, where it is
shown that the wave-like behaviour allows predictions that are not allowed on
the grounds of a particle-like behaviour. In conclusion, we upheld that quantum
waves must be real even if they do not belong to the same ontological level of
events, which connected with particle detections.
KEY WORDS: complementarity; ghostfield; virtual field; potentiality; empty
wave.
1. INTRODUCTION
The nature of the wave–particle duality, the fundamental empirical evi-
dence on which has been created quantum mechanics, is a highly con-
troversial question, and from the very beginnings of such a theory all
possible alternatives have been explored. The interpretations of the Schrö-
dinger wave function, and of its relationship with particles or particle-like
behaviour, may be broadly cast into two main groups: In the first one,
there are those interpretations that have refused to attribute any form of
reality to the quantum wave. In the second group, on the contrary, fall
all other interpretations that have tried to assign a reality to the quantum
waves. Let us first briefly consider these two historical positions. Then, we
will try to find a third position.
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2. THE QUANTUM WAVES ARE NOT REAL
The most radical position connected with to the first group may be
resumed saying that there are neither waves, nor particles. In this case, a
radical refute of the classical categories is expressed, assuming that only
the mathematical formalism is meaningful and any attempt at giving an
ontological interpretation is considered as nonsense and as a metaphys-
ical way to handle the problem. This first interpretation may be found
in early works of Heisenberg, who thought that the concepts of position
and velocity and that therefore also a space–time description are applica-
ble to quantum systems(1) (pp. 344–345). He assumed that the meaning
of quantum observables coincides with the place they have in an exper-
imentally tested formalism and consists in their mutual relationships at
a formal level, for instance in the uncertainty between conjugate pairs(2)
(p. 478).
A second position rejecting quantum waves is represented by Born’s
statistical interpretation. Born dropped both Heisenberg’s and (as we shall
see) Schrödinger’s interpretations, proposing a further solution (for which
he was awarded of the Nobel Prize in 1952) according to which the
quantum wave may be understood as a ghostfield (Gespensterfeld, a word
introduced by Einstein), in the sense that the waves could guide the
particles on their path.(3) However, this field represented a mere mathemat-
ical tool being devoid of energy and momentum. These physical proper-
ties, on the contrary, may only be attributed to the particles, which, in this
way, become the exclusive ontological referents of the quantum theory.
Max Born was one of the first physicists to acknowledge the importance
of the Schrödinger equation and to stress that the dynamical evolution
of quantum systems must obey to it. Exactly as a consequence of this
assumption, together with the previous understanding of quantum waves,
Born coherently expressed the thesis that the quantum evolution must be
indeterministic and that the Schrödinger equation must consequently rule
only transition probabilities and not individually determined systems or
events in the classical sense. These probabilities cannot therefore be depen-
dent on subjective ignorance of the state of the system and are rather
objective (again the expression ‘ghostfield’ may be helpful). The successive
step was to interpret the square modulus of the coefficients of the wave
function expansion as the probabilities to find the particle in the relative
states.(4,5)
Born’s point of view was combined with Heisenberg’s original position
and perhaps most coherently developed by Wigner(6) and is meanwhile
almost become the official doctrine in quantum mechanics.(7) Wigner
pointed out that only detection events are real (what you get is what you
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measure) and that the wave function is only a mathematical tool in order
to calculate probabilities between a detection event and another.
The third position is represented by the complementarity between
wave and particle-like description. It is difficult to completely understand
and synthesize the original position of Bohr when he expressed, in 1927–
1928, his complementarity principle.(8) What is sure is that Bohr refuted
to attribute any reality to the particle or to the wave independently from
the context of macroscopic experience and of a given experimental set-
up. In other words, these two classical concepts were considered applicable
to quantum-mechanical systems only to the extent to which the latter are
inserted in a given experimental context, and the contexts in which the
wave-like behaviour or the particle-like behaviour appears are mutually
exclusive. Does this mean a form of idealism or at least of subjectivism
as suggested by many authors? It is difficult to answer to this question; it
seems to us that Bohr preferred to leave it to a certain extent unanswered.
We wish, moreover, to point out the existence of two possible variants of
the complementarity principle.
• In the first, no ontological level can be assigned, neither to the wave
nor to the particle. Here, a kind of subjectivism seems unavoidable.
• However, there is also a second possibility, which we will discuss in
the following: a form of interactionism that does not exclude the
possibility to ascribe a form of ontological reality both to the waves
and to the particles. As we shall see, probably Bohr has shifted
from one position to the other.
3. THE QUANTUM WAVES ARE REAL
The first attempt at assigning a form of physical reality to the waves
of quantum-mechanical systems was the historical article of Bohr, Slater,
and Kramers (BSK)(9) and Jammer(1), in which they supposed the exis-
tence of a virtual radiative field (the analogy with Einstens ghostfield is
evident, but, as we shall see, there are very important differences), such
that the transitions between atomic stationary (stable) states are induced
by the field of the atom itself and of the surrounding atoms, but are
insensitive to the fields of atoms that are located far away. The inter-
ferences produced by the field originated by a given atom and those
generated by the surrounding atoms explains the probabilistic, and not
deterministic, nature of the transitions. However, for this reason, the
authors supposed that also the vectorial momentum of the electrons had
a non-zero probability to be directed everywhere, and, as a consequence,
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the conservation laws of momentum (and of energy) could only have a
statistical value and not an exact validity for the individual systems. As
it is well-known, this hypothesis was explicitly disproved very soon by an
experiment performed by Bothe and Geiger(10–12) and by Compton and
Simon.(13) In the article of BSK there were also two points which, from
our present perspective, appear as two weaknesses:
(1) We cannot have a field in any classical sense where there are non–
local relations between the components — as it happens actually
for quantum systems, — that is we cannot have relations that vio-
late the separability principle. In fact, the authors supposed that
the field was a space–time mechanism or at least equivalent with
a space–time mechanism.
(2) The transitions between stationary states were supposed to be
induced by the field. It is true that the BSK also assumed (due to
the interference between different fields) that these transitions are
probabilistic. However, interferences and probabilities, here, have
both a classical nature, so that it could be in principle possible to
account for the final transition wholly in a deterministic manner.
On the contrary, quantum systems show an irreducible probabilis-
tic behaviour, such that there is no way to reduce the indetermin-
istic character of quantum events, which for this reason remain
unpredictable.
Two years or so later, Schrödinger tried to attribute a classically onto-
logical reality to the waves, maintaining, moreover, that they constituted
the only reality and that what we call particles are actually simple
wave-packets confined in small portions of space.(14,15) Against such a
perspective, several objections were advanced promptly, in particular that
quantum waves do not propagate in ordinary space(8) and that wave pack-
ets will be dispersed in a too tiny time in order to be in accordance with
the experienced stability of matter(16)(pp. 31–33).
A more sophisticated realistic approach to the problem was proposed
by de Broglie. In order to understand de Broglie’s position, one must have
clear the distinction between two different approaches:
• the theory of the pilot wave,
• and that of the double solution.
The theory of the pilot wave is a de Broglie’s proposal in order to understand the
basic ontology of the microworld as composed of two different entities both
endowed of physical reality: a wave and a particle. The waveψ is a classical field
that moves wave-like in the space and that ‘pilots’ a classical particle embedded
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in the field, The particle is therefore sensible to any wave-like superposition of
the field. In the example of a two-slit experiment, the particle, factually, though
both slits are open, always passes only through one slit, and the diffraction
pattern is entirely due to the strange and wave-like trajectory impressed by the
field. In this perspective there is no complementarity between wave and particle
and no ‘indeterminacy’ at all.
The double solution theory is a mathematical treatment of the same idea:
The correlation between particle and wave is a phase correlation, such that the
particle is a singularity of the field, which differs fromψ only in amplitude, and
which represents another, non-linear solution of the wave equation.
De Broglie published his results in a series of articles(17–19), but, in his
lecture to the great scientific auditorium at the Fifth Physical Conference of
the Solvay Institute in Brussels (October 1927), he presented only the sim-
plified version of the whole: the pilot wave theory.(20) The several important
criticisms to his proposal, brought de Broglie to abandon the theory. Hence,
in a public lecture at the university of Hamburg in early 1928 he embraced the
complementarity principle(16)(pp. 110–114), but he returned later (1955–1956)
to his old proposal in a more systematic way, i.e. in the form of a double solution
theory.(21)
As we have stressed, a logic consequence of de Broglie’s interpreta-
tion would be the non-linear effects produced by the field. On the grounds
of these ideas Bialynicki-Birula and Mycielski tried to develop an explicit
non-linear formalism.(22) Successive experimental attempts at determining
the value of these non-linear factors have however failed,(23,24) so that,
even if the hypothesis could not be completely ruled out, also its propo-
nents admitted its extreme improbability(25)(p. 50).
Another important consequence of the previous perspective is that a clas-
sical field together with a classical wave should produce deterministic results.
This line of thought was in particular developed by Bohm initiating a new field
of investigation: the one of hidden-variable theories.(26) However, also in this
case experimental evidence does not support such an interpretation(27)(part
IX).
4. THE QUANTUM WAVES ARE REAL BUT NOT IN THE
CLASSICAL SENSE . . .
Towards the end of the fifties Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg, the three
main exponents of the non-realistic interpretation of quantum waves have
partially modified their position. As Selleri has pointed out,(28) after Fock’s
criticism to the subjectivistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, accord-
ing to which there are no valuable reasons to deny the reality of the wave
function and that the interaction between observed system and apparatus
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is not as much incontrollable as Bohr originally thought, the latter began
to shift his position giving to it a more objective turn. It is very interesting
when we confront two quotations of Bohr. In 1955 he said:(29)
One has sometimes seen in the notion of complementarity a reference to the
subjective observer, incompatible with the objectivity of scientific description. Of
course, in every field of experience we must retain a sharp distinction between the
observer and the content of the observations, but we must realize that the dis-
covery of the quantum of action has thrown new light on the very foundation of
the description of nature and revealed hitherto unnoticed presuppositions to the
rational use of the concepts on which the communication of experience rests.
Though Bohr refuted to dissolve physics in a form of subjective idealism,
it is also almost clear that he thinks here that the subjective side cannot
be eliminated since it enters in the rational use of the concepts. However,
three years later he says:(31)
The decisive point is that in neither case [relativity and complementarity] does
the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the
observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous appeal to the observing expe-
rience. [ . . . ] In complementary description all subjectivity is avoided by proper
attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of elementary
physical concepts.
Here the position seems quite opposite and, anyway, any ambiguity that
was present in previous formulation of complementarity is disappeared.
Born, on the other hand, showed later a more positive attitude toward
waves because, in 1964, he affirmed that it is impossible to perform prob-
ability predictions without referring to something objective(32)(p. 105). In
this case, the ghostfield that he introduced in 1926 may be something more
than a pure façon de parler.
Even Heisenberg, though never abandoning his strong faith in the
superiority of the formalism as such, seemed to shift his initial posi-
tions.(33) In the fifties, Heisenberg asked what happens ‘in reality’ in quan-
tum processes. He acknowledges that the concept ‘event’ must be limited
to observations and that any attempt at attributing reality to quantum
phenomena independently from observation leads to contradictions. Not-
withstanding, the wave function joints subjective and objective elements,
because it contains assertions on the tendencies of a given system, and
these are completely objective and independent from the observer. Now,
Heisenberg’s point of view is that, when measuring the interaction of the
system with the whole universe also enters in the dynamical process and
this may be called the subjective component only to the extent to which
we cannot control these effects. For this reason, Heisenberg could use the
Aristotelian concept of potentia when speaking of the initial state of the
system and affirm that it is the dynamical process during the measurement
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Fig. 1. Mach–Zender interferometer. The photons are pumped one at a time from the
laser on the left and be split at the beam splitter BS1 into two components, going the
upper and the lower arm, respectively. After being reflected by mirrors M1 and M2, a
phase shifter PS is tuned for producing interferences between the two components that
are merged and resplit at BS2. Finally, the two outgoing beams fall into detectors D1
and D2.
to allow the passage from the potentia to the actuality, i.e. to a given com-
ponent of the initial superposition.
A realistic interpretation was further developed by Franco Selleri.(34)
In fact, Selleri pointed out that, while no momentum and energy could be
attributed to the wave (but only to the particle), its interference effects (the
guide function of the field) would be notwithstanding real and detectable
because it would have to produce sensible effects on the probability distri-
butions. Moreover, as already said, Selleri was conscious to work in a line
partially going back to the later efforts of Bohr and Born,(28) but he com-
bined this line of thought with the ideas of de Broglie. In order to under-
stand this point, we must consider a further consequence of de Broglie’s
positions, which was seen and understood for the first time by Selleri him-
self.(34) Let us consider the apparatus shown in Fig. 1. As it is well known,
if the phase difference between the two paths is put to zero, the detector
D1 will detect the dark output (no photon): This is due to the geometry
of the apparatus and in particular to the destructive interference that is
produced in BS2.
Suppose now a variation of the set-up, as shown in Fig. 2. In this
case, if a photon is not absorbed by the object O, it will no longer show
interference at BS2 and will have therefore a non-zero probability to fall
into D1. In this case, we have detected the presence of an obstacle with-
out interacting with the object O. How could we explain this situation?
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Fig. 2. An interaction–free measurement set-up proposed by Elitzur and Vaidman.(30)
If φ = 0, detector D1 clicks only if one of the arms is blocked by the object O.
A possibility could be de Broglie’s model. Let us first return to the initial
situation of Fig. 1. In this case, the photon (that, according to de Broglie,
is always localized in one of the two arms) takes one of the two paths,
but interference is notwithstanding produced at BS2 because the field also
act on the other path. Since there is no photon in this component, it may
be called an empty wave. In the case of interaction-free measurements, the
interference is avoided because the empty wave is blocked by O. This is a
very clear model of the situation.
It is very important to stress that this line of thought is quite differ-
ent from Bohr’s complementarity, even if the latter is interpreted with an
objective turn. In fact, de Broglie’s hypothesis is the contemporary exis-
tence of wave and particle and is therefore completely foreigner to any
idea of exclusion or complementarity. De Broglie’s ideas were strongly
supported by Vigier and co-workers.(35,36) It is important to stress that
Vigier and co-workers’ attempts, differently from Selleri’s ones, were
sharply characterized by an aim to directly contradict the complementar-
ity principle. Their idea was to show that, even if a particle is detected, a
real classical, Maxwell, wave is always present.
Another experimental proposal is due to one of us, and is more faith-
ful to the original Selleri’s idea.(37) Instead of two detectors and two beam
splitters, we have four detectors and four beam splitters (see Fig.3). The
idea is this: Suppose that a photon is detected by D1 or D2. Will there
be still an interference at D3–D4? If this is the case, this can only be
because an empty wave has travelled through the other path. A further
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Fig. 3. The experiment proposed by Tarozzi. LGT represents here a laser gain tube.
Fig. 4. The figure shows as lightly different version from the original proposal of
Tarozzi. The geometry is not exactly reproduced.
improvement of Tarozzi’s original idea could be the apparatus shown in
Fig. 4. In this case, we have a non-linear crystal NL that produces two
outgoing photons in the same state. The ideas of Tarozzi have influenced
further contributions.(38)
For a certain time, it seemed that the idea of Vigier and co-work-
ers could be confirmed. In particular, an experiment of Rauch and co-
workers seemed to show that they may be interference effects also when
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Fig. 5. Smooth complementarity between wave and particle.
a particle is detected,(39) and in this way Vigier and co-workers inter-
preted the result.(40) However, the experiment could also receive a com-
pletely different interpretation. It could be the case, that instead to be a
refutation of complementarity, it were a confirmation of this principle, but
introducing a significative modification of Bohr’s original ideas. In fact,
in the same year, Mittelstaedt, Prieur, and Schieder published a paper in
which they showed that complementarity is a smooth variation between
wave-like and particle-like behaviours and that therefore there are infinite
intermediate possibilities between the two extreme alternatives.(41) Obvi-
ously, this run against Bohr’s idea that complementarity is a sharp relation
in which we have either the wave or the particle. The set-up of Mittelstaedt
and co-workers is very simple (see Fig. 5): By letting varying the reflec-
tion and transmission parameters of BS1 we may obtain all intermediate
situation between a wave and a particle. This threw light on the results of
Badurek and co-workers: They obtained in fact an intermediate situation
and for this reason they could detect something by obtaining at the same
time interference. The results of Mittelstaedt and co-workers were antici-
pated by Wootters and Zurek,(42) and confirmed by Greenberger and Ya-
sin(43) and by Englert.(44)
On the other hand, the idea of an empty wave or at least the idea
of a classical (de Broglie) empty wave was disproved by some experiments
performed by Mandel and co-workers(45) (see Fig. 6). In this experimental
set-up is supposed that a non-null empty wave may go through the second
non-linear crystal. In another, more complicated, experimental set up(46)
there is no necessity of this assumption.
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Fig. 6. Schematic representation of Mandel’s experiment on empty waves. An ini-
tial beam is split by a beam splitter (BS1) and the resulting beams travel toward two
non-linear crystals of LiIO3 (NL1 and NL2). From NL1 a signal photon (s1) and an
idler photon (i1) emerge: The i-photon passes through NL2 and will be aligned with
the second idler (i2), emitted by NL2 together with the second signal photon (s2). The
two s-photons are combined by the beam merger (BM) and the outgoing beam falls
on detector Ds , whereas the two idler photons fall on detector Di , The action of BS2
is such that the output beams travel toward the second non-linear crystal (NL2) and
toward the third detector (D3). Now, if detector D3 clicks, from the point of view of
the empty wave theory an empty wave (i1) should fall on D1 and still induce coherence
between s1 and s2. Experimental results showed no coherence in this case, which sup-
ports the interpretation of quantum waves as probability amplitudes.
Also an experiment of Hardy, in order to prove the existence of
empty waves(47) (see Fig. 7) could arrive to no conclusive results because
the effect could be explained by means of the ordinary quantum mechan-
ics without empty waves(27)(pp. 484–487).
5. TO WHAT EXTENT BE REAL?
The previous examination seems to lead to no result: Any attempt at
proving a reality of quantum waves seems to fail. However, there is also a
positive result. The smooth complementarity shows that there is no reason
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Fig. 7. Hardy’s experiment. In the box in the lower path there
is an atom. The main idea is that, if the phase difference between
the two paths is tuned to 0, the detector D1 will click only in the
case the photon takes the upper path, since, otherwise it would
be absorbed by the atom. In this case, then, if the state of the
atom will be changed, this can only be a consequence of an
empty wave that took the lower path.
to assign reality only to the particle, since there is a continuous chain
between something that we do not hesitate to call physical and real —
because it is provided with energy and momentum — and a wave. Obvi-
ously, one could reject also the reality of the particle and limit oneself to
admit the reality of detection events only, in the spirit of the first Heisen-
berg’s interpretation. However, there are reasons to think that a measure-
ment can never completely purify a system from the interference effects
that are present, and as a matter of fact interference effects have been
shown to exist also at mesoscopic level,(48,49) and probably still exist in the
macroscopic world. Then, in the general case we can also conceive a con-
tinuous transition between a detection event and an initial, say, superposed
state(27)(parts IV–VI). This will not mean that the measurement result is
predictable. In fact, during a measurement we may suppose that the off-
diagonal elements of the density matrix describing the object system tend
to zero, but actually never reach zero.(50,51) Now, it is very easy to con-
ceive a continuum between the density matrix describing the initial state
of the system and that describing the state after the measurement. On the
other hand, the final density matrix approaches to a mixture and this is
a consequence of the fact that a large part of the initial information has
been downloaded in the environment. As already Heisenberg suggested, it
is an incontrollable process(52) and this explains why we cannot predict the
measurement result. If we are right, then there is no reason to attribute
ontological reality to the detection events and not to the initial state or to
the quantum wave.
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However, if a quantum wave has somehow an ontological reality,
then, as already Selleri suggested, there must be a means to obtain pre-
dictions that are different from those that we would perform on the basis
of a corpuscular behaviour. Obviously, this must happen, as explained in
the previous section, by satisfying the smooth complementarity principle.
This idea led the authors to propose an experiment that can show how
to obtain different predictions in a complementary experiment.(53) Sup-
pose the apparatus shown in Fig. 8. If we discard the cases where a single
detector detects two photons, we obtain an entangled state of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |4〉 + |2〉 |3〉 ) . (1)
In other words, if detector D1 clicks, we can predict with certainty that
D4 will click, and, if D2 clicks, we can predict that D3 will click. In this
case we have both entanglement and wave-like behavior. It is interesting,
now, to see what happens if we displace detectors D3 and D4 to a position
before BS4 once a photon has already been detected by D1 or D2 — this
is a delayed-choice experiment,(54) but with an important difference: Here,
already an event occurred (D1 or D2 has already clicked). In this case, we
can obtain information about which photon has been detected by D1 or D2
Fig. 8. A source laser pomps a photon in the state |γ 〉 . Successively, a parametric-
down-conversion allows the emission of two photons, the idler photon (in the state | i〉 )
and signal photon (in the state | s〉 ). if γ has frequency ν and energy hν, the two outgo-
ing photons have smaller frequencies νi and νs (and energies hνi and hνs ), respectively,
with ν = νi + νs . The two beam splitters BS1 and BS3 split each photon in two compo-
nents, the ‘shorter’ and ‘longer’ components (| is〉 , | il〉 and | ss〉 , | sl〉 , respectively). The
two shorter (longer) components, | is〉 and | ss〉 (| il〉 and | sl〉 ) are recombined at BS2
(BS4), giving rise to photons in states | 1〉 and | 2〉 (| 3〉 and | 4〉 ), falling to detectors
D1 and D2 (D3 and D4). Eventually, detectors D3 and D4 are placed before BS4 when
D1 or D2 has already clicked.
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and which photon has been detected by D3 or D4. Now, although we can
know which photon has been detected by which detector and therefore the
paths they follow, we cannot predict whether detector D3 or detector D4
will reveal the photon after either detector D1 or detector D2 has clicked.
We also observe that, on account of the first interference (by BS2) and of
the superposition of the two components of the i-photon and of the super-
position of the two components of the s-photons, the latter situation (when
detectors D3 and D4 are placed before BS4) is not the classical situation
that would arise if both BS2 and BS4 were removed. In this case, if D1
clicks, we know with certainty that the i-photon has been detected and that
the s-photon (if not detected by D2) will reach D3. On the other hand,
if D2 clicks, we know with certainty that the s-photon has been detected
and that the i-photon (if not detected by D1) will reach D4. We see that
the conditional probabilities of the ‘classical’ case are neither similar to the
conditional probabilities of the path detection after the interference at BS2,
nor to the ‘entangled’ situation. In fact, in the latter case, if D1 clicks only
once, D3 will click too, whereas in the ‘classical’ set up, if D1 clicks (and
not D2), D3 will click as well; and similarly if D2 clicks.
We wish to stress that our proposed experiment differs from other per-
formances testing the complementarity principle, because, in general, many
runs are needed in order to obtain an interference (undulatory) pattern at
the detectors. In our experiment, on the contrary, the effect of the undula-
tory pattern is shown in single runs and therefore for individual systems.
Now, if we are able to predict something different and new (i.e. whether D3
or D4 will click) when we have wave-like behaviour relative to the predictions
allowed by the corpuscular behaviour, we see no reason for not attributing an
ontological reality to the wave. Obviously, the difficulty is to understand what
type of reality this can be. However, before examining the problem, we wish to
stress that here two different questions are merged together.
• It is an uncontroversial fact that measurement results are unpredict-
able and that therefore there cannot be a classically causal relation-
ship between the initial state and the detection event.
• However, should this mean that this measurement outcome comes
from nothingness? Let us consider, for the sake of simplicity, the
delayed choice experiment in Wheeler’s original formulation.(54) We
have a photon as input and a photon as output. In between we
have no event. Will this perhaps mean that the photon has dis-
appeared and is then (from nothingness) reappeared at the detec-
tors? We think this is a vital question, because if the answer were
positive, the whole scientific enterprise would become a non-sense.
Then, the only possible answer can be negative.
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If so, we are forced to admit that there must be a form of reality that is not of the
type of events and that is not connected through classically causal chains with
other realities. In other words, we must distinguish between (1) causal condi-
tions and events, on the one hand and (2) a more general class of conditions
that are not events and do not determine the individual output through a univ-
ocal causal chain, on the other. This means that the initial state is a complex
of conditions that is somehow real but not sufficient to determine individual
events.
As a consequence, this reality (the wave or the initial state of a given
system) cannot be directly measured. It has been shown, that a measure-
ment of the state of a single system would contradict the unitarity of
quantum transformations.(55) This may be also seen in this way: Any mea-
surement is local in nature, whereas the wave is non-local as such due
to the correlation between different components. (Obviously these corre-
lations do not violate the relativity but only the separability principle.) As
we have said, to do not having taken into account this fact is one of the
weakness of the 1924 article of Bohr and co-workers.
For these reasons, the reality of the wave can only be inferred and it
is not possible to do direct experience of it. This is due to the fact that
any experience of a quantum system presupposes a specific selection of
an initial (possible and continuous) amount of information.(52,56). In other
words, the initial state or the wave contains, at the level of potentiality,
all the information that is possible to extract from it. But this information
cannot be accessed to because it is the entangled ensemble of all possible
answers to our questions to the system. In this way, we return to Heisen-
berg’s idea that the initial state is a form of Aristotelian potentiality.
If we are right, the reality of the waves cannot be at same level as the reality
of the particles or of the detection events — to this extent we also agree with
the initial Born’s tenet. Of the latter is possible to do experience, of the former
not.
6. CONCLUSIONS
One could reply: What is this fuzzy idea that there can be a real-
ity we cannot have direct experience of, and this not because of our
physical limitations but in principle? Obviously, this is a difficulty. How-
ever, our conclusion for us seems to be the only legitimate one from the
data at our disposal. Then, the problem is that science is not prepared, has
not the instruments to handle a problem of this import because the main
axiom on which modern science is built is that the only things which are
real are the ones of which we can do direct experience. Therefore, at the
1690 Auletta and Tarozzi
actual state of facts, we cannot proceed very much on the path of deter-
mining what is this quantum-mechanical entity that we call ‘wave’. How-
ever, as we have already said, our ignorance cannot be a reason to deny
that the things are so.
APPENDIX: DIALOGUE BETWEEN AN ORTHODOX AND A
REALIST
R: My problem is the following. In an interferometry experiment,
could we speak of the existence of something, of a form of reality before
we detect the photon?
O: How should I know this if not through a detection? This makes
the expression ‘the existence of something before detecting it’ a pure non–
sense. In order to know that something exists, you must do experience of
it and therefore, in a physical context, detect it.
R: However, there are plenty of things which we never experience
directly: Quarks, black holes, and so on.
O: This is right. However, we speak here not of a problem of scale,
rather of an impossibility in principle, i.e. to detect something before we
detect it.
R: In many cases, we are obliged to have recourse to inferences when
direct experience is impossible. Then, I would say: ‘To infer the existence
of something before we detect it’.
O: I do not see how you could perform this inference, given that it
is only the experimental context as such to guarantee the necessary condi-
tions in order to extract any conclusion. Your inference seems to be rather
a form of pure imagination.
R: I can restate the problem as follows: You have a photon as input
in the interferometer and a photon as output (at the detectors). Is there
nothing in between?
O: How can I speak of something without having the possibility to
experience it? Now, you should agree that before the detection event we
have no event at all, and without an event it is impossible to speak of
‘experience’. It did not happened anything at all! Moreover, what assures
to me that I have a photon as input?
R: This is a very easy problem to solve. You can tune the laser in
order to emit photons so that two next emissions are separated by a given
time interval. We can verify this by let the photons be detected before they
enter in the interferometer. Once we have perfectly tuned the laser, we may
be assured that, after a certain time, the photon has passed the first beam
splitter.
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O: This is right. However, my main question remains unanswered:
How can I speak of something without having the possibility to experi-
ence it?
R: Please, let aside a moment the epistemological question (how it is
possible to know something before a detection) and, please, answer simply
to this question: Is the input photon disappeared in the nothingness and
is the output photon reappeared from the nothingness?
O: This cannot be the case, since we would fall in a pure idealism,
which is absolutely contrary to the enterprise of natural science. However,
it is devoid of meaning to attribute any character to this ‘in between’,
given that any attribution presupposes at least the possibility to do expe-
rience of the object to which I attribute the character.
R: This is right. However, can a physical reality come out from some-
thing that is not a physical reality?
O: This is again impossible.
R: Then, you must coherently admit that, before the detection event,
you have a physical reality.
O: This can be. However, it is a very strange physical reality such a
one whose I cannot do experience.
R: This is right. Perhaps, the time is ripe to change our understand-
ing of physical reality. Perhaps the world does not consist only in objects
that can be directly experienced.
O: This is again a strange conclusion.
R: It can be. But it is the only rational conclusion. If it is so, then this
reality can and must be thought appropriately. Physics would abdicate if it
would show itself unable to do this.
O: Perhaps I begin to see your point of view.
R: Once we agree on this result, I leave to your intelligence and per-
sonal reflection to think about how this reality can be interpreted.
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